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Abstract
This is an attempt to formalize the conditions of possibility for free,
libre, open access to scientific knowledge within a game. The challenge
is to enunciate the terms under which agents participating in the "Grand
conversation" of science would be willing to open share, exchange, ne-
gotiate or surrender their contributions, considering their corresponding
intentions, goals, beliefs and expected utilities. Many conclusions can be
drawn from the game here described. We have made many simplyfing
decisions along the modelling process that must be taken into account as
a determining context for those conclusions, of course. It can be safely
state, however, that under the current conditions of the game, Editors
will keep betting on Toll Access, knowledge distribution models even if all
the other Academic agent go for Open Access.
1 Introducción
This is an attempt to formalize the conditions of possibility for free, libre, open
access to scientific knowledge within a game. The challenge is to enunciate the
terms under which agents participating in the "Grand conversation" of science
would be willing to open share, exchange, negotiate or surrender their contri-
butions, considering their corresponding intentions, goals, beliefs and expected
utilities.
We have been studying the possibility, suitability and possible success of
modeling the forms of advocacy of, and resistance to, Open Access to the sci-
entific literature according to game theory methodology. While this approach
was deemed to be both highly innovative and original, the simplifications need
to make this approach work were judged to be too extensive to design a real-
istic model with the available information. As an alternative, it was decided
that doing a thorough survey of points and terms of resistance as they appear
according to the stakeholders, namely researchers, graduate students, junior
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faculty, senior faculty, administrators, funders of research, publishers, libraries
and politicians, would form a useful first step toward the original objective.
Also, it has been deemed crucial to distinguish between developing, emergent
and developed countries, hoping to address complexities and accounting for lo-
cal idiosincracies in the process. Having done so, however, we were faced with
the enormous complexity of the global situation and were forced to make the
simplifications that are used and discussed in this paper.
The paper is organiced as follows: Firstly, an update on the history of science
and technology, particularly with regard to scientific publishing. In section 3 we
summarize the development of a definition for open access. Section 4 develops
the view of open access in science as a game of interests. The last section
presents the conclusions.
2 An update on the history of science and techno-
logy, particularly with regard to scientific pu-
blishing.
Publishing is a crucial action for the existing setup of global science. In a
very simplified view, it correspond to the stage in which the results of research
and experimentation are communicate to everybody with the primary objective
of enlightening people and, therefore, helping to solve their problems. Seeing
science as a open and global enterprise entails, however, a secondary objective
for publishing: the results must be verified and validated by other scientists
all over the world, so as to establish the quality and general validity of those
results. And a third objective in this sequence is to allow those results to be
made available for further research, to empower those that are willing to keep
researching the corresponding family of problems.
This simplified view of the processes of science related to publishing, which
is almost all that is taught about the history of science to most new scientist, is
actually too simple in many ways. In the most established of western views, for
once, science do not simply progress by validation of general results, but it also
advanced by refutation of hypothesis aspiring to be general resultsLakatos et al.
[1976]. The urge to check on somebody else’s results is not (only) to do the good
deed of validating a work that can be trusted, but an interest in finding lacks
or cracks in their proposed explanation. That is to refute them and establish
their conclusion (and their model) as invalid and, therefore, to force the search
for a new model. This has the further implication of establishing that positive
and negative results are both very important for the advancement of science.
All these interactions over positive and negative results create the layout for the
grand conversation of science which must be published for it own sake.
But there is another dimension in which that view is too simple. It is the
implicit assumption that there are equally meaningful families of problems to
which scientists suscribe and try to solve as a team for the benefit of everybody.
It is equivalent to the very naïve assumption that there exist a supreme, neutral
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goal for science and that scientist should and will be equally motivated to work
in their chosen family of problems disregarding the local circunstances in which
their (the scientists and their poblems) are embedded.
The truth is that science is heavily influenced by technological, economics
and political dinamics. In the western societies, for instance, it is normally
expected that a scientific development will turn into a technological solution
and, eventually, a product or a service that the public can consume to solve
their needs. And which needs must be solved first is, of course, a collective
choice. A market choice for some, but in any case, a political decision (which is
not the same as a decision made by politicians, even though it can be).
Scientific publishing, in particular, has been influenced by economical con-
cerns since very early in its history. As explained in Guedón [2001], the very
origins of the concept of intelectual property can be traced back to a (very
succesful) attempt to extend the concept of landed property: “This bit of legal
creativity was actually motivated by the stationers who needed to establish
legally viable claims over the texts they printed, if only to protect their trade
from imitation and piracy. To them, this meant exclusive and perpetual owner-
ship, as is the case for land property. But they were not the only players
and, as a result of various court actions, the definition of what they actually
claimed to own remained murky for several decades, almost a century, actually”
(.ibid, chapter 3, our emphasis).
We will not say more about the history of printed documents except that,
with the arrival of Internet and the XXI century electronic technology, making
a copy of a book became a process of almost cero cost (apart from the costs of
producing the book in the first place). In this context, the actual value of the
text (images included) can be almost completely mapped to its content and,
eventually, to its authors. This new situation has apparently triggers a wave
of questions about the origins of that value and of who are entitled to use and
enjoy each contribution. A line of questioning that is particulary striking for
the scientific practice, where scientists constantly look for accessing ideas and
proposals by other scientists while trying to solve scientific problems.
3 The development of a definition for open ac-
cess.
Peter Suber in Suber [2012] explains the effects of that shift from ink on paper
into digital or electronic texts. This book relates that ideal conditions for the
grand conversation of science: authors that are free to read and share their
ideas in the process of designing, establishing, reporting and refuting theories
and experiments. Those conditions we call Open Access, OA, and they can be
summarized like this:
“What is open access? Open access means that scientific literature should be
publicly available, free of charge on the Internet so that those who are interested
can read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, refer to and, in any other
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conceivable legal way, use full texts without encountering any financial, legal or
technical barriers other than those associated with Internet access itself”1.
What, in turn, makes OA possible? Suber kindly sumarizes an answer like
this: “OA is made possible by the internet and copyright-holder consent. (.ibid,
pg 9)”. He goes on to make clear what OA is not intented for: “OA isn’t an
attempt to bypass peer review [..]. OA isn’t an attempt to reform, violate, or
abolish copyright [..]. OA isn’t an attempt to deprive royalty-earning authors
of income [..]. OA isn’t an attempt to deny the reality of costs [..]. OA isn’t
an attempt to reduce authors’ rights over their work [..]. OA isn’t an attempt
to reduce academic freedom [..]. OA isn’t an attempt to relax rules against
plagiarism [..]. OA isn’t an attempt to punish or undermine con- ventional
publishers [..]. OA doesn’t require boycotting any kind of literature or publisher
[..]. OA isn’t primarily about bringing access to lay readers [..]. Finally, OA
isn’t universal access [..]” (.ibid, pg 20–27).
From this brief account it must be clear that copyright-holders’ interests are
crucial. This is the reason why we have chosen to study the problem as a game
of interests.
4 Open Access in science as a game of interests.
Conditions of possibility for equilibrium.
Let us formally define the game we are analizing. From mathematical game
theory Leyton-Brown and Shoham [2008], a game is a tuple (N,A,u) where:
• N is a finite set of n players, indexed by i;
• A = A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ An, where Ai is a finite set of actions available to player
i. Each vector a = (a1, . . . , an) in A is called an action profile;
• u = (u1„ . . . ,un) where ui: A → R is a real-valued utility (or payoff)
function for player i.
The amount of players and the number of possible actions for each one is impor-
tant for combinatorial reasons. Thus, let us start by listing the actual agents
involved in the target problem and see if that that list and the lists of their
actions can be simplified. Agents in the game of scientific knowledge include,
at least, the following:
1. Researchers
2. Graduate students
3. Junior faculty
4. Senior faculty
5. Librarians
1http://openaccess.mpg.de/2365/en
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6. Administrators
7. Funders of research
8. Editors
9. Politicians
These are, of course, groups of people distributed all over the world and with
many other particular characteristics. Thus, this is already a reduction of com-
plexity. We believe, however, that for the problem of scientific knowledge gen-
eration and distribution, those categories would suffice. But they are still too
many when one considers the number of possible actions for each agent group.
So, let us try another symplification together with the listing of those action
possibilities:
Agents Actions
Academics
Publish TA
Publish OA
Perish
Administrators
Support TA
Support OA
Support Both
Funders
Demand publications
Demand OA publications
Don’t demand anything
Editors
Grant TA
Grant OA
Grant big deals
Grant OA with embargoes
Politicians
Permit TA
Demand green OA
Demand gold OA
Demand some OA
Table 1: Players and their actions, second approximation
In Table 1, we reduce the list of agents to 5 and present some actions for
each agent type. With this proposal, we are still dealing with 33 ∗ 42 = 432
possibilities. But at this point we can discuss some general features of this
game. We are simplyfing the actual game in another aspect. By concentrating
on actions related to the issue of access to scientific communications, papers
in particular, we manage to reduce the number of possible actions, but also,
let us called it, the timeframe of the game. It is like an instantaneous game.
Although actions can take extended and different times to be executed, we will
be focused on the net effect of an agent making a move at time that coincides
or overlaps other moves by other agents in the game. This is, of course, another
simplification.
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Let us insist that, in this game, each agent represents a group of people. This
is particularly important because it allows us to take modelling advantage of a
normally obscured concept in game theory: the concept of mixed strategy. A
mixed strategy is a linear combination of pure strategies. And a pure strategy
correspond to a choice of one particular action by the agent.
For example, “publish OA” correspond to the actions of academics publishing
their research as open access documents. It is also, as such, a pure strategy for
the agent Academics in table 1. What would it be a linear combination of pure
strategies?. Some weighted decisions about those actions. For example, one
could say that “Academics” selects “publish TA” with a probabilty of 0.8 (80%),
“publish OA” with 0.2 (20%) and never selects “perish”. In simple agents game
theory, these probabilities are hard to imagine (who is her/his right mind would
play a lotery to make an important decision), but in our context of groups as
agents one could easily attribute those probabilities to some polling over the
members of that game. In the last example, this would mean that 80 percent
of the members of the group “Academics” publish their research as so-called toll
access, 20% as open access and nobody refrain from publish (as this would be
suicidal).
We were tempted to further simplifying with the assumption that funders
and politicians are one and the same group of people. We have to refrain from
this after noticing that important effects of the actions, also known as outcomes
in game theory, would be underepresented. In particular, there is a important
reduction in the model which have to be balanced: there is no explicit represen-
tation of the whole society, an allegedly important component of the academic
ecosystem as the final receptor or consumer or, at least, user of knowledge gener-
ated by the other components (a reduction itself, as knowledge could come from
other sources). We decided to deal with this by keeping the politician agent
and modelling the expected outcomes as discrete fields of selected variables, as
shown in table 2:
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Agents Actions Outcomes
Academics
Publish TA
Publish OA
Perish
Opportunity {Maximal, Minimal}
Visibility {More, Less}
Prestige {More, Less}
Promotion {More, Less}
Administrators
Support TA
Support OA
Support Both
Savings {More, Less}
Funders
Demand publications
Demand OA publications
Don’t demand anything
Quality results {More, Less}
Editors
Grant TA
Grant OA
Grant big deals
Grant OA with embargoes
Income {More, Less}
Politicians
Permit TA
Demand green OA
Demand gold OA
Demand some OA
Societal impact & relevance {More, Less}
Table 2: Players, actions and outcomes (with the sets of possible values)
Table 2 describes outcomes with a set of variables that can be associated to
the actions of each agent-group. We have chosen the variables that we believe
involved in determining the utility for each agent but, instead of consolidating
a mathematical expression of it, we assign a finite set of possible values to each
variable and, thus, define a discrete universe of possibilities to explore. As a
reference, let us indicate a couple of possibilities to describe the current situation
and an ideal situation, from the point of view of Open Access. Let us depict
those along with the explanation of the variables and assigned values.
Agents Actions Outcomes
Academics Publish TA
Opportunity Minimal
Visibility Less
Prestige More
Promotion More
Administrators Support TA Savings Less
Funders Demand publications Quality results Less
Editors Grant TA Income More
Politicians Permit TA Societal impact & relevance Less
Table 3: Interesting case 1, the pure current model
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Agents Actions Outcomes
Academics Publish OA
Opportunity Maximal
Visibility More
Prestige More
Promotion More
Administrators Support OA Savings More
Funders Demand OA publications Quality results More
Editors Grant OA Income Less
Politicians Demand green OA Societal impact & relevance More
Table 4: Interesting case 2, the pure ideal model
Table 3 presents what we believe is characteristic of the current situation.
With overyone stuck to the TA option in their actions, academics are very
limited in their abilities to learn from contributions of others (as nobody can
afford to buy them all) and, therefore, their opportunity to get published and
participate in the gran conversation is minimal. Their visibility is, by the same
reasoning, compromised (less), whereas for those who can actually get published
(possibly by balancing other interests not shown in this model) prestige and
promotion are guaranteed (more). Toll access, TA, forces administrators to pay
more than they could for accessing collections. So, if they actually support TA,
their institutional savings would be less. Funders who do request publications
as outcomes of the projects they fund would definitely have less quality results.
The only group clearly favored in this setup is editors who sustain more income
than otherwise possible. Finally, by restricting opportunities to academics and
other members of the public to learn about contributions which remain behind
a paywall, politicians will see that the actual impact and relevance of those
contributions to society is lesser than possible.
Table 4 paints a contrasting picture. Academic commits their publications
to OA, empowering others to consult and use those publications to support their
own. Thus, the opportunity to publish is maximal. But, of course, visibility,
prestige and promotion are favored with more opportunities for all. By encour-
aging and supporting OA, administrators contribute to more budget savings
at their institutions. Funders will see more quality results by demanding OA
publications, not only because more publications will actually be made, but
also because more people, academics included, will have opportunities to see
and judge those results. This configuration, of course, also determines that
politicians will see more impact and relevance of results for society. Again, the
dissonats are the editors who would more likely see less net income in their
regular bussiness.
We must, of course, swiftly admit that we just made another simplifying
exercise very unsual in game theory. Instead of jumping to numerical estimates
of utilities, which could then be used to balance expected utilities for the agents’
strategies, by resorting to discrete domains for the variables, we are doing a
more qualitative analysis which could be enlighting and does not rules out a
traditional equilibrium study. The resulting search space, however, it is still
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Figure 1: Some combinations of actions
huge. There are 110592 = (33 ∗42 ∗28) possible combinations of those variables-
values. But not all the combinations are meaningful in reality.
We introduced some meaningful connections between the variables in this
model by devising a set of rules and constraint among their values and running
a tailored made contraint logic program on them. By these means, we reduced
the set to 3136 combinations. Some (26) of them are shown in figure 4.
This set of 26 action profiles is special for a number of reasons. But before
explaining, let us show the rules used to generate the whole set:
if Academics=‘Publish TA’ and Editors=‘Grant TA’ then Aca-
demics’ Opportunity = ‘Less’ and Visibility =‘Less’
if Academics=‘Publish OA’ and Editors=‘Grant OA’ then Aca-
demics’ Opportunity = ‘More’ and Visibility =‘More’
if Administrators =‘Support OA’ then Savings=‘More’, other-
wise Savings=‘Less’.
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if Funder=‘Demand publications’, Editors=‘Grant TA’ and Politi-
cians=‘Permit TA’ then Editor’s Income = ‘More’.
if Editors=‘Grant OA’ then Editor’s Income = ‘Less’.
if Editors=‘Grant big deals’ and Politicians=‘Permit TA’ then
Editor’s Income = ‘More’.
if Funder=‘Demand publications’, Editors=‘Grant TA’ and Politi-
cians=‘Permit TA’ then Editor’s Income = ‘More’.
if Editors=‘Grant OA with embargoes’ then Editor’s Income =
‘Less’.
if Funder=‘Demand OA publications’ then Editor’s Income =
‘Less’.
if Politicians=‘Demand green OA’ then Editor’s Income = ‘Less’.
if Visibility=‘More’ then Quality Results=‘More’ and Impact
and Relevance=‘More’
Over the thus reduced set of possibility, we move to consider the regular next
step in game theory modelling. Utility functions are required for each agent to
be able to compared strategy profiles and search of equilibrium conditions. Once
again, we try a very simple approach taking advantage of the very simplified
domains we have assigned to the values of variables used to describe game’s
outcomes. Let us assume that ‘More’ values correspond to one (1) and ‘Less’
values to zero (0). A global utility function for this system could be:
GU = Opportunity + Visibility + Prestige + Promotion + Savings + Results
+ Income + Impact and Relevance
A global utility function, however, is disregarded by the foundational as-
sumptions in game theory, which state that agents in a game could not agree
on a common, global set of preferences (and therefore utilities) and must be
assigned independent criteria for each. Otherwise, the game would reduce to a
standard optimization problem.
Before we complain, let us point out that this global utility function is,
nevertheless, meaningful and it could indicate in our case, a situation in which
all the agent reach their higher benefits (GU = 8, in our simplified model).
In fact, the 26 combinations in figure–4 are the only ones that correspond to
a GU=7, the highest value observed in the whole set of 3136 pure strategic
profiles. This fact is important, as it makes us wonder whether all the agents in
this game can be satisfied and reach their highest levels of benefits. To answer
this, we need their particular utility functions.
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Figure 2: Actions profiles with values and utilities
Let us follow the simplified approach suggested by tables 2 to 4 and define
the corresponding utilities like this:
UAcademics = Opportunity + Visibility + Prestige + Promotion
UAdministrators = Savings
U Funders = Results
U Editors = Income
U Politicians = Impact and Relevance
Figure–4 shows the actions profiles in the previous figure–4together with
their outcome’s values and utilities.
4.1 Equilibrium conditions
Are there conditions for equilibrium in this game?. Let us consider the more
common approach to equilibrium in game theory: Nash Equilibrium, starting
from the definition of best response by a player (From (Leyton-Shoham, 2012)):



(Best Response) Player i’s best response to the strategy profile s−i
is a mixed strategy s∗i ∈ Si such that u(s∗i , s−i) ≥ u(si, s−i) for all
strategies si ∈ Si
In this context, each agent, a player, must be analized separately and by
means of strategy profiles which, in their purest form, are the action combina-
tions shown above (an pure profile is precisely a row in figure–4). The set of all
strategy profiles (which includes all the possible action combinations, but also
mixed strategies as explained above) is Si. The variable si refers to the actions
(possibly mixed strategy) of the player under scrutiny and s−i are the actions
(or strategies) of the other agents in the game. Thus, a best response for agent
i is an action (or strategy) that produces the greatest utility (for agent i, of
course) among all its actions (or strategies) given the same set of actions (or
strategies) for the rest of the agents.
We are now prepared for the definition of Nash Equilibrium:



	(Nash equilibrium) A strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a Nashequilibrium if for all agents i, si is a best response to s−i
The reader must bear in mind that all these cumbersome references to strate-
gies instead of actions is due to the fact that the former also include those mixed
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linear combinations of actions.
Let us now try to analyze our game seeking Nash equilibria. As noticed
before, one of the practical difficulties in this game is that we are dealing with
a big set of agents and actions. However, one can take further step of reduction
and transform the game into many two-players games, each of which would look
like table 5.
Editors
big deals TA OA OA with embargoes
Academics Publish TA (3,1) (3,1) (3,0) (3,0)
Publish OA (3,1) (3,1) (4,0) (3,0)
Table 5
The outcomes values in table 5 has been obtained from the actual utility
computations of the original game. The ones shown in bold correspond to
profiles in which the global utility, as we defined above, is 7. Whereas the ones
in italic corresponds to profiles where that utility is 6, as there no such kind of
combination reaching 7.
To make things clearer, let try one last simplification transforming table 5
to an even simpler version:
Editors
TA OA EUAcademics
Academics TA (3,1) (3,0) 3q
OA {3,1} (4,0) 3q + 4(1− q)
EUEditors p 0
Table 6
In table 6, we use q to represent the probabity that Editors play for TA
action, that is one of Grant big deals or Grant TA, leaving (1-q) to indicate
a OA action (Grant OA or Grant OA with embargoes). We could have use p
to model the probabilities for Academics, but, as the reader can verify, it is no
necessary.
In this game, the strategy profile (Academics = OA, Editors =TA) is a
Nash equilibrium. It is made of the best responses from each agent to the other.
5 Conclusions
Many conclusions can be drawn from the game here described. We have made
many simplyfing decisions along the modelling process that must be taken into
account as a determining context for those conclusions, of course. It can be
safely state, however, that under the current conditions of the game, Editors
will keep betting on Toll Access, knowledge distribution models even if the whole
set of Academics goes for Open Access.
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